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Science	in	inaction	–	The	shifting	priorities	of	the	UK
government’s	response	to	COVID-19	highlights	the
need	for	publicly	accountable	expert	advice.
The	phrase	following	the	science	is	repeated	frequently	in	relation	to	government	policies	to	address	COVID-19.
However,	what	this	science	might	be	and	how	it	is	better	than	other	‘sciences’	is	less	frequently	explained.	In	this
post,	Jana	Bacevic	reviews	the	UK	government’s	initial	response	to	the	COVID-19	outbreak	and	argues	that	a	key
factor	determining	the	UK	government’s	approach	was	a	closed	advisory	system	that	enabled	particular	scientific	or
epistemic	communities	to	have	disproportionate	influence	on	policymaking.	To	address	this	deficiency,	scientific
advisory	systems	need	both	a	greater	variety	of	experts	and	greater	transparency.
One	of	the	consequences	of	the	Coronavirus	may	be	a	re-evaluation	of	the	role	experts	and	expertise	play	in
society	and	policymaking.	Recent	stories	in	the	UK	media	have	emphasised	the	role	of	the	Scientific	Advisory
Group	for	Emergencies	(SAGE),	including	Chief	Scientific	Adviser	Sir	Patrick	Vallance,	and	Chief	Medical	Officer
Chris	Whitty	in	–	depending	on	the	account	–	shaping	or	failing	to	shape	the	UK	Government’s	Covid-19	strategy.
What	does	this	tell	us	about	the	role	of	experts?	
Scientific	advisory	panels	do	not	make	policies.	Rather,	their	role	is	to	summarise	and	distil	available	research	to
help	guide	politicians	in	decision-making.	In	this	sense,	while	the	remit	of	experts	is	limited	by	the	kind	of	questions
politicians	ask,	they	have	relative	freedom	in	selecting	and	using	evidence.	However,	decisions	about	what,	and
whose	perspective,	counts	as	‘evidence’,	are	not	neutral.	
Reports	in	the	media	have	overwhelmingly	focused	on	SPI-M	(Scientific	Pandemic	Influenza	Group	on	Modelling),
the	modelling	subsection	of	SAGE.	Yet,	in	the	early	stages	of	the	pandemic,	the	Government	also	took	advice	from
another	subsection:	the	Scientific	Pandemic	Influenza	Group	on	Behaviours,	or	SPI-B.	First	convened	during	the
H1N1	(‘swine	flu’)	in	2009/10,	SPI-B	was	reconvened	on	13	February	2020	to	provide	guidance	on	behavioural	and
social	interventions.	This	raised	questions,	in	particular	concerning	the	association	of	behavioural	science	with	the
famous	‘Nudge’	unit.	While	the	Government	has	argued	that	Coronavirus	strategy	was	uniquely	driven	by	the	“best
evidence	available”,	the	SAGE	documents	tell	a	somewhat	different	story.	
This	suggests	one	of	the	reasons	the	UK	Government	was	slow	to	adopt	stricter	lockdown	measures
was	not	only,	and	possibly	not	primarily,	the	fear	they	would	be	ineffective:	it	was	the	fear	they	would	be
unpopular
The	specific	advice	SPI-B	was	asked	to	provide	included	the	risk	of	widespread	public	disorder;	the	use	of
behavioural	and	social	interventions	(including	school	closures	and	general	social	distancing);	and	how	to
communicate	with	the	public,	especially	vulnerable	groups.	While	the	group	affirmed	support	for	stopping	mass
gatherings,	it	had	a	negative	view	of	school	closures,	which	were	deemed	“highly	disruptive”;	it	also	cited	evidence
from	Japan	suggesting	growing	discontent	around	this	policy.	Experts	in	SPI-B	were	split	over	the	value	of
recommending	general	social	distancing,	arguing	that	household	isolation	together	with	school	closures	would	lead
to	an	unexpected	displacement	of	activity,	and	thus	increase	the	likelihood	of	discontent	and	non-compliance.	The
document	“Combined	behavioural	and	social	interventions”	from	4	March	deems	isolation	of	symptomatic	cases,
and	isolation	of	at-risk	members,	as	the	combination	of	interventions	most	likely	to	be	socially	acceptable.	This	may
explain	why,	in	the	early	stages	of	the	pandemic,	the	Government	insisted	there	was	no	need	for	a	stricter	lockdown
or	social	distancing.
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What	made	SPI-B	advise	against	measures	adopted	elsewhere?	In	the	absence	of	reliable	data	–	research	on	the
success	of	different	non-pharmaceutical	interventions	(including	widespread	testing	and	contact	tracing)	was	just
beginning	to	emerge	–	SPI-B	drew	on	two	kinds	of	evidence.	One	was	existing	behavioural	science,	including
assumptions	about	the	degree	to	which	certain	policies	could	be	applicable	to	the	UK.	The	other	were	results	of
public	opinion	surveys	conducted	by	agencies	such	as	Yougov,	Ipsos,	and	Cabinet	Office-contracted	BMG
Research,	between	January	and	March	2020.	These	polls	focused	on	Coronavirus	awareness,	risk	perception,	and
–	importantly	–	public	approval	for	governmental	interventions.	This	suggests	one	of	the	reasons	the	UK
Government	was	slow	to	adopt	stricter	lockdown	measures	was	not	only,	and	possibly	not	primarily,	the	fear	they
would	be	ineffective:	it	was	the	fear	they	would	be	unpopular.	
Of	course,	it	is	possible	to	claim	that	governments	have	a	duty	to	protect	the	population,	regardless	of	whether
those	measures	are	popular	or	not.	It	is	equally	possible	to	claim	that	the	emphasis	on	popularity	had	more	to	do
with	preventing	public	disorder,	than	with	the	ratings	of	any	particular	politician	or	party.	Either	way,	the
Government’s	early	focus	on	the	reactions	of	the	public	shows	a	remarkable	degree	of	similarity	with	the
behavioural	approach	that	prefers	to	govern	through	‘messaging’,	rather	than	intervening.	
This	provides	a	different	angle	on	the	role	of	expertise	in	the	Covid-19	pandemic.	In	crises,	politicians	tend	to
privilege	the	advice	they	believe	will	allow	them	to	control	the	situation.	Crisis	situations,	like	pandemics,	are
characterised	by	multiple	and	overlapping	forms	of	uncertainty:	about	the	virus	itself,	its	consequences,	and	rate	of
transmission	(R).	It	is	not	surprising	that,	in	the	initial	confusion	the	Government	turned	towards	what	it	thought	it
could	predict	and	manage:	the	behaviour	of	the	population.	After	independent	experts,	the	media,	and	the	public
started	repeatedly	raising	concerns	about	UK’s	divergence	from	WHO	approach,	it	deferred	to	a	different	expert
opinion,	for	this	purpose	represented	in	the	Imperial	College	study.	
This	does	not	mean	that	the	UK	Government	was	misled	by	a	‘cabal’	of	behaviourists,	any	more	than	by	a	‘cabal’	of
modellers.	All	epistemic	communities	are	limited	by	their	epistemic	assumptions,	as	well	as	theoretical	and
methodological	traditions.	Under	conditions	of	competition	for	public	funding,	not	to	mention	the	prestige	associated
with	being	able	to	advise	on	public	policy,	it	is	not	surprising	that	epistemic	and	disciplinary	communities	will	strive
to	preserve	privileged	access	to	these	resources,	to	the	degree	of	excluding	all	others.	
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Exclusivity	and	non-transparency	of	expert	panels,	like	SAGE,	make	these	sort	of	epistemic	monopolies,	where
specific	epistemic	communities	exercise	singular	or	disproportionate	influence,	easier	to	maintain.	‘Experts’	are	not
immune	to	epistemic	biases.	In	the	evidence	list	of	SPI-B,	there	is	reference	to	advice	received	from	“academic
specialists	in	Health	Psychology,	Social	Psychology,	Anthropology	and	History”;	but	there	is	also	a	notable	absence
of,	for	instance,	sociologists	or	specialists	in	public	health.	
Under	conditions	of	competition	for	public	funding,	not	to	mention	the	prestige	associated	with	being
able	to	advise	on	public	policy,	it	is	not	surprising	that	epistemic	and	disciplinary	communities	will	strive
to	preserve	privileged	access	to	these	resources
This	does	not	imply	that	simply	widening	the	pool	of	‘experts’	would	have	resulted	in	a	better	strategy.	Just	like	it	is
ridiculous	to	suggest	economists	have	the	answer	to	the	Corona	crisis,	it	is	hubristic	to	assume	any	single
epistemic	community	has	privileged	access	to	solutions	to	complex	social	problems.	What	we	need	instead	is	a
relationship	between	different	kinds	of	‘science’,	policy,	and	society	that	is	open,	non-hierarchical,	and	aware	of	the
inevitable	limitations	of	any	single	epistemic	position.	This	also	requires	trust	in	the	capacity	of	the	‘public’	to	learn
about	and	evaluate	different	kinds	of	specialist	knowledge.	
What	does	this	mean	for	the	role	of	expertise	in	a	society?	Neither	the	epistocratic	‘trust	in	science’	nor	the	populist
mantra	‘the	people	have	had	enough	of	experts’	are	likely	to	offer	an	answer.	Expert	panels	have	to	be	open,
transparent,	and	democratic;	but,	then	again,	so	do	politicians.	Science	(and	knowledge	more	generally)	that	work
for	the	public	are	mutually	exclusive	with	epistemic	monopolies,	regardless	of	whether	they	created	through	market
competition,	artificial	scarcity,	inherited	privilege,	or	the	belief	that	people	are	‘dumb’	or	‘irrational’.	Challenges	in	the
decades	to	come	are	going	to	require	both	more	diverse	knowledge,	and	more	specific	forms	of	expertise.	It	is	time
to	make	them	truly	open,	inclusive,	and	public.
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